

New Challenges in Merger Control in Europe

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All views expressed are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Commission

Competition



Improving the functioning of EU merger control

- The EU Merger Regulation is well proven ...
- ... but all legal instruments should regularly be reviewed ("Refit" programme)
- 2 on-going policy projects:
 - Simplification
 - Possible reform of the Merger Regulation



Simplification – Objectives

- Streamline procedures
- Cutting red tape for businesses, in particular for non-complex cases
- Focus resources on problematic cases



Simplification

• Extending scope of the simplified procedure

- Significant increase of market share thresholds and introduction of new category for small increments
- Shifting ca. 10% of cases from normal to simplified procedure resulting share expected around 70%
- Streamlining of Form CO, Short Form CO, Form RS
 - Significantly reduced information required
 - e.g. higher threshold for affected markets, overall less market shares
 - De minimis information requirements for JVs with no activities in EEA
 - More scope for waivers
- Accelerating pre-notification process
 - Continued to be offered as service, may not be needed in all categories of simplified cases



Simplification: State of Play

- Public consultation during 1st half of 2013
 - Overall very positive reaction
 - Critical comments focus mainly on:
 - » Concept of "plausible alternative" market definition
 - » Scope of requirement to supply internal documents
- Modifications envisaged following public consultation:
 - Address main points raised by stakeholders, in particular for information requirements
 - Some more flexibility for pre-notification more responsibility of parties
- Adoption by Commission by autumn 2013



Possible reform of the Merger Regulation

- Consultation paper "Towards more effective EU merger control" published 20 June 2013
 - No need for a major overhaul of the EUMR (report on functioning of the EUMR, 2009).
 - Limited number of issues examined:
 - Minority shareholdings
 - Referrals
 - Technical issues
 - Open discussion launched on possible improvements. No decision taken yet on amendment of the EUMR.



Enforcement gap in relation to acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings?

- Under the EU Merger Regulation:
 - The Commission has no jurisdiction to examine cases of acquisition of minority stakes which do not confer control ...
- ... but where it has jurisdiction, the Commission:
 - takes existing minority shareholdings into account when analysing effects of a merger on competition
 - may require divestiture of minority stake as condition for clearance
 - ... leads to rather unsatisfactory situation that control depends on timing of acquisition of minority stake
 - Articles 101 and 102 TFEU insufficient legal basis for comprehensive tackling of the problem



Minority shareholdings – theories of harm

Theory of Harm	Silent Stake	Rights short of control
Horizontal unilateral effects	\checkmark	\checkmark
Coordinated effects	\checkmark	\checkmark
Input foreclosure	(✓)	\checkmark
Customer foreclosure		\checkmark



Enforcement Gap – Findings

- Existing legal tools at EU level may not cover all possible anticompetitive effects deriving from acquisitions of minority shareholdings
- Need to extend EU merger control to the acquisition of noncontrolling minority shareholdings
- Limited number of cases expected, but relevant enforcement activity
- Strike the right balance: Design system that
 - ensures to catch the (relatively small) number of potentially anticompetitive transactions
 - avoids unnecessary administrative burden
 - fits in the existing system of merger control at EU and national levels



Minority shareholdings – Design and Options

Two basic options:

- Notification system:
 - Extend current system of ex ante notification of mergers to minority shareholding
- Selective system:
 - Commission may investigate transactions most likely to raise competition concerns; Commission's discretion to examine cases
 - No stand-still obligation



Minority shareholdings – Design and Options (cont'd)

Selective system: possible designs

- Self-assessment system
 - No filing obligation for the parties
 - Commission relies on market intelligence and complaints
- Transparency system
 - Parties file short information notice (to be published on website)
 - to inform the Commission
 - to allow Member States to ask for referral



Minority shareholdings – Design and Options (cont'd)

- Commission's powers to examine structural links
 - Definition of transactions caught:
 - Quantitative threshold (10% like in US): high number of cases, of which only a small part may be problematic
 - Qualitative threshold (like material influence): small number of cases, most of which may warrant scrutiny
 - Delineation to Article 101 TFEU / joint ventures
- Delineation of competences between Commission/Member States
 - Turnover thresholds
 - Referrals
- Procedure
 - Voluntary notifications in selective system?



Referral system

- Pre-notification referrals from Member States to Commission (Article 4(5) EUMR):
 - Streamline procedure: maintain system, but parties can directly notify to the Commission
- Post-notification referrals from Member States to Commission (Article 22 EUMR):
 - Enhance legal certainty: only a competent Member State can refer case to Commission
 - Achieve "one-stop-shop": Commission can accept referral if no competent Member State opposes; then it has jurisdiction for the whole EEA
- Commission open to consider possible improvements for referrals from Commission to Member States



Next steps:

- Public consultation until mid-September
- VP Almunia to decide on the basis of the public consultation and the discussions with Member States whether to proceed with a legislative proposal